[15] See "Revenues," iii. 3; A. Zurborg, "de. Xen. Lib. qui {Poroi}
inscribitur," p. 42.

[16] Cf. "Hell." III. iv. 16; IV. ii. 5 foll.
[17] "In reward for justice in, etc." See "Revenues," l.c.; and for

the evil in question, Thuc. i. 77; Plat. "Rep." 556.
[18] {eispheroien}, techn. of the war-tax at Athens. See "Revenues,"

iii. 7 foll.; iv. 34 foll.; Thuc. iii. 19; Boeckh, "P. E. A." pp.
470, 539. Cf. Aristot. "Pol." v. 11. 10, in illustration of the

tyrant's usual method of raising money.
And that which of all arts is the most remunerative, albeit the least

accustomed hitherto to be conducted on the principle of
competition[19]--I mean agriculture--itself would make enormous

strides, if some one were to offer prizes in the same way, "by farms
and villages," to those who should perform the works of tillage in the

fairest fashion. Whilst to those members of the state who should
devote themselves with might and main to this pursuit, a thousand

blessings would be the result. The revenues would be increased; and
self-restraint be found far more than now, in close attendance on

industrious habits.[20] Nay further, crimes and villainies take root
and spring less freely among busy workers.

[19] Al. "and what will be the most repaying . . . being a department
of things least wont," etc.

[20] Or, "soundness of soul much more be found allied with
occupation."

Once more, if commerce[21] is of any value to the state, then let the
merchant who devotes himself to commerce on the grandest scale receive

some high distinction, and his honours will draw on other traders in
his wake.

[21] Cf. "Revenues," l.c.
Or were it made apparent that the genius who discovers a new source of

revenue, which will not be vexatious, will be honoured, by the state,
a field of exploration will at once be opened, which will not long

continue unproductive.[22]
[22] Lit. "that too is an inquiry which will not long lie fallow."

And to speak compendiously, if it were obvious in each department that
the introducer of any salutary measurewhatever">whatsoever will not remain

unhonoured, that in itself will stimulate a host of pople who will
make it their business to discover some good thing or other for the

state. Wherever matters of advantage to the state excite deep
interest, of necessity discoveries are made more freely and more

promptly perfected. But if you are afraid, O mightyprince, that
through the multitude of prizes offered[23] under many heads, expenses

also must be much increased, consider that no articles of commerce can
be got more cheaply than those which people purchase in exchange for

prizes. Note in the public contests (choral, equestrian, or
gymnastic)[24] how small the prizes are and yet what vast expenditure

of wealth and toil, and painfulsupervision these elicit.[25]
[23] Reading {protithemenon} with Cobet.

[24] Lit. "hippic, gymnic, and choregic contests."
[25] e.g. "in the choral dances (1) money on the part of the choragoi;

(2) pains on the part of the choreutai; (3) supervising care on
the part of the choro-didaskoi, and so mutatis mutandis of the

hippic and gymnic."
X

And Hiero replied: Thus far you reason prettily, methinks, Simonides;
but about these mercenary troops have you aught to say? Can you

suggest a means to avoid the hatred of which they are the cause? Or
will you tell me that a ruler who has won the affection of his

subjects has no need for body-guards?
Nay, in good sooth (replied Simonides), distinctly he will need them

none the less. I know it is with certain human beings as with horses,
some trick of the blood they have, some inborn tendency; the more

their wants are satisfied, the more their wantonness will out. Well
then, to sober and chastise wild spirits, there is nothing like the

terror of your men-at-arms.[1] And as to gentler natures,[2] I do not
know by what means you could bestow so many benefits upon them as by

means of mercenaries.
[1] Lit. "spear-bearers"; the title given to the body-guard of kings

and tyrants.
[2] Lit. "the beautiful and good," the {kalois kagathois}. See "Econ."

vi. 11 foll.
Let me explain: You keep them, I presume, in the first instance, for

yourself, as guards of your own person. But for masters, owners of
estates and others, to be done to death with violence by their own

slaves is no unheard-of thing. Supposing, then, the first and foremost
duty laid on mercenary troops were this: they are the body-guards of

the whole public, and bound as such to come to the assistance of all
members of the state alike, in case they shall detect some mischief

brewing[3] (and miscreants do spring up in the hearts of states, as we
all know); I say then, if these mercenary troops were under orders to

act as guardians of the citizens,[4] the latter would recognise to
whom they were indebted.

[3] "If they become aware of anything of that sort." Is not this
modelled on the {krupteia}? See Pater, "Plato and Platonism," ch.

viii. "Lacedaemon," p. 186.
[4] Or, "as their police." {toutous}, sc. "the citizens"; al. "the

evil-doers." If so, transl. "to keep watch and ward on evil-doers;
the citizens would soon recognise the benefit they owe them for

that service."
But in addition to these functions, such a body might with reason be

expected to create a sense of courage and security, by which the
country labourers with their flocks and herds would greatly benefit, a

benefit not limited to your demesne, but shared by every farm
throughout the rural district.

Again, these mercenaries, if set to guard strategic points,[5] would
leave the citizens full leisure to attend to matters of more private

interest.
[5] Or, "as garrisons of critical positions," like Phyle or Decelia

near Athens.
And again, a further function: Can you conceive a service better

qualified to gain intelligencebeforehand and to hinder the secret
sudden onslaughts of a hostile force, than a set of troopers always

under arms and fully organised?[6]
[6] Or, "trained to act as one man." See Sturz, s.v.

Moreover, on an actualcampaign, where will you find an arm of greater
service to the citizens than these wage-earning troops?[7] than whom,

it is likely, there will none be found more resolute to take the
lion's share of toil or peril, or do outpost duty, keeping watch and

ward while others sleep, brave mercenaries.
[7] The author is perhaps thinking of some personal experiences. He

works out his theory of a wage-earning militia for the protection
of the state in the "Cyropaedia." See esp. VII. v. 69 foll.

And what will be the effect on the neighbour states conterminous with
yours?[8] Will not this standing army lead them to desire peace beyond

all other things? In fact, a compact force like this, so organised,
will prove most potent to preserve the interests of their friends and

to damage those of their opponents.
[8] Or, "that lie upon your borders," as Thebes and Megara were "nigh-

bordering" to Athens. Cf. Eur. "Rhes." 426; Soph. "Fr." 349.
And when, finally, the citizens discover it is not the habit of these

mercenaries to injure those who do no wrong, but their vocation rather
is to hinder all attempts at evil-doing; whereby they exercise a

kindly providence and bear the brunt of danger on behalf of the
community, I say it must needs be, the citizens will rejoice to pay

the expenses which the force entails. At any rate, it is for objects
of far less importance that at present guards[9] are kept in private

life.
[9] "Police or other."

XI
But, Hiero, you must not grudge to spend a portion of your private

substance for the common weal. For myself, I hold to the opinion that
the sums expended by the monarch on the state form items of

disbursement more legitimate[1] than those expended on his personal
account. But let us look into the question point by point.

[1] {eis to deon}. Holden cf. "Anab." I. iii. 8. Aristoph. "Clouds,"
859, {osper Periklees eis to deon apolesa}: "Like Pericles, for a

necessary purpose, I have lost them."
First, the palace: do you imagine that a building, beautified in every

way at an enormous cost, will afford you greater pride and ornament
than a whole city ringed with walls and battlements, whose furniture

consists of temples and pillared porticoes,[2] harbours, market-
places?

[2] Reading {parastasi}, properly "pillasters" (Poll. i. 76. 10. 25) =
"antae," hence "templum in antis" (see Vitruv. iii. 2. 2); or more

widely the entrance of a temple or other building. (Possibly the
author is thinking of "the Propylea").Cf. Eur. "Phoen." 415; "I.

T." 1159. = {stathmoi}, Herod. i. 179; Hom. "Il." xiv. 167; "Od."
vii. 89, {stathmoi d' argureoi en khalkeo estasan oudio}.

The brazen thresholds both sides did enfold
Silver pilasters, hung with gates of gold (Chapman).

Al. {pastasi}, = colonnades.
Next, as to armaments: Will you present a greater terror to the foe if

you appear furnished yourself from head to foot with bright emlazonrie
and horrent arms;[3] or rather by reason of the warlikeaspect of a

whole city perfectly equipped?
[3] Or, "with armourcuriouslywrought a wonder and a dread." {oplois

tois ekpaglotatois}, most magnificent, awe-inspiring, a poetical
word which appears only in this passage in prose (Holden). L. & S.

cf. Hom. "Il."i. 146, xxi. 589, of persons; "Od." xiv. 552, of
things. Pind. "Pyth." iv. 140; "Isth." 7 (6), 30.

And now for ways and means: On which principle do you expect your
revenues to flow more copiously--by keeping your own private

capital[4] employed, or by means devised to make the resources of the
entire state[5] productive?

[4] Reading {idia}, al. {idia}, = "your capital privately employed."
[5] Lit. "of all citizens alike," "every single member of the state."

And next to speak of that which people hold to be the flower of
institutions, a pursuit both noble in itself and best befitting a

great man--I mean the art of breedingchariot-horses[6]--which would
reflect the greater lustre on you, that you personally[7] should train